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Abstract 
Modern central business districts are characterised by high-rise office buildings. Helsley and 
Strange (2008) argue that skyscrapers are caused by agglomeration economies and a prize for 
being the tallest, so a reputation effect. We aim to test the relevance of this model by 
investigating the impact of building height on commercial office rents. The results show that 
firms are willing to pay about 4 percent more for a building that is 10 meters taller, which we 
interpret as the sum of a within-building agglomeration effect and a reputation effect. Using 
semiparametric techniques, we disentangle reputation effects from agglomeration effects and 
demonstrate that the reputation effect is substantial for tall buildings. For example, it is at 
least 17.5 percent of the rent for a building that is 6 times the average height.  
 
Keywords: commercial buildings, building height, landmarks, reputation effect, 
semiparametric regression, agglomeration effect 
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                                               I. Introduction
 
In contemporary cities, skyscrapers are an increasingly common sight in areas where rents are 
high. Urban economists usually assume that high density buildings are merely the result of a high 
price for land, which provides an incentive to economise on land and to increase expenditure on 
building capital (Mills, 1967; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). However, it is argued that the 
presence of very tall buildings cannot be fully explained by standard urban economic models 
(Helsley and Strange, 2008; hereafter HS). HS indicate that skyscrapers arise from two 
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additional basic forces. First, workers may be more productive in skyscrapers, which we label as 
within-building agglomeration economies. Tall buildings imply an extreme density of workers, 
allowing for internal returns to scale (Gold, 1981). As almost all tall buildings are offices that host 
many tenants, within-building external returns to scale may also play a role. An important source 
of external returns encompasses face-to-face contacts, leading to knowledge spillovers between 
workers (Marshall, 1890; Storper and Venables, 2004; Combes et al., 2008).1 Moreover, Jacobs 
(1969) argues that a diverse portfolio of firms may lead to product innovations and new 
combinations. Arzaghi and Henderson (2010) show that most of these externalities take place 
within a very close distance from the firm location, especially for high-end business services. 
Within-building interactions are more likely than between-building interactions because 
restaurants, gym facilities, etc. are shared among workers of the same building. Moreover, the 
low time cost of vertical (within-building) transportation using elevators (compared to 
horizontal transportation) stimulates interactions and leads to the construction of tall buildings, 
even on cheap land (Sullivan, 1991). 
Second, HS point out that there is an inherent value placed on being the tallest, a reputation 
effect. A developer may receive a prize (social status, reputation etc.) when it constructs tall 
buildings.2 This may lead to overbuilding, as a builder has an incentive to construct a building 
that is taller than the welfare-maximising one. Given a competitive building industry, this 
reputation effect must capitalise in office rents, i.e. firms have a preference to locate in tall 
buildings that are landmarks, as a favourable reputation allows firms to set higher prices, attract 
investors and attract a talented workforce (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; 
Eichholtz et al., 2010).3  
Although the construction of tall buildings requires enormous investments and receives much 
attention in the media, the economics of building height are underexposed. The literature heavily 
                                                            
1 Another source is dense input-output linkages between buyers and suppliers. However, such linkages 
likely account for only a small part of clustering of firms (Storper and Venables, 2004). 
2 In their theoretical model, HS assume that only the tallest building gains additional value. In reality, one 
may expect that, for example, the ten tallest buildings in a certain area generate an additional mark-up. 
3 We ignore here the effect on workers. Workers may prefer to work in tall buildings because of better 
views as well as reputation. Note that these are non-taxed consumption goods, whereas wages are taxed as 
income. In addition, reputation is a good with positional externalities. From a welfare perspective, it is 
then plausible that firms oversupply building height and undersupply wages (Katz and Mankiw, 1985; 
Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and Van Ommeren, 2011). 
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relies on studies that theoretically investigate the development of skyscrapers and high-rise 
buildings (Arnott and McKinnon, 1977; Grimaud, 1991; Sullivan, 1991; Bertaud and Brueckner, 
2005; HS). Empirical evidence is limited to studies which confirm that height competition is a 
determinant of building height, although this only holds for a small portion of the building stock 
(Barr 2010a; 2010b). To what extent taller buildings receive rent premiums, and more specifically, 
whether there is a reputation premium, is unknown. 
In this paper, we will estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for tall buildings in the 
commercial real estate market using an extensive dataset on office transaction prices. Using a 
hedonic price framework, we aim to distinguish between the price effect due to within-building 
agglomeration effects and due to reputation, while controlling for other building and location 
characteristics. We take into account the role of unobserved characteristics by including area 
fixed effects at a very low level of aggregation and employing an instrumental variables approach, 
where the presence and height of nearby buildings that are constructed before World War II are 
used as instruments for building height.4 In this way, we also control for spatial variation in 
prices that is due to variation in the demand for land as indicated by standard urban economic 
theory (Fujita, 1989). In addition to standard hedonic price estimation approaches, we also 
investigate whether building height is nonlinearly related to rents employing a semiparametric 
control function approach. The latter approach enables us to identify the (minimum) reputation 
effect. This effect can be disentangled from within-building agglomeration effects by assuming 
that the marginal agglomeration effect is diminishing in height, which is in line with HS. It is 
important to note that, although in the Netherlands, maximum building height restrictions are 
common, hedonic price analyses are still applicable. 
The results show that firms are willing to pay about 4 percent more to locate in a building 
that is 10 meters taller. It appears that the willingness to pay for building height is highly 
nonlinearly related to rents, and the marginal effect is non-monotonic. We then demonstrate that 
the reputation effect is at least 17.5 percent of the additional rent for a building that is 6 times the 
                                                            
4 If locations are attractive for firms for unobserved reasons, one expects that buildings are higher and 
rents are higher, causing a spurious positive correlation between rents and building height (Bayer and 
Timmins, 2007; Combes et al., 2008). However, zoning plans may force firms to cluster at, ceteris paribus, 
unattractive locations (as attractive locations are reserved for residential land use), which causes a 
spurious negative correlation. 
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average height. We only find evidence of within-building agglomeration benefits, and not of 
between-building agglomeration effects, suggesting that interactions between workers are an 
extremely local phenomenon (see Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). We also derive the welfare 
costs of height restrictions that are shown to be higher than when a constant rent over building 
height is assumed (which is the standard assumption in the literature on regulatory constraints, 
see Glaeser et al., 2005; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). 
This paper continues as follows. In Section II, we briefly discuss a sequential model of 
skyscraper development, proposed by HS, and considers the estimation procedure. In Section III, 
we elaborate on the regional context, data and identification strategy. In Section IV we present 
and discuss the results, including a robustness analysis. Section V concludes and derives some 
policy implications. 
 
II. Model and methodology 
A.     The Helsley and Strange Model 
Let’s assume a city with many locations, wherein tenants occupy one unit of floor space. The 
profit function of a tenant located in building ݅ is then given by ߨ௜ ൌ ݌ݍሺ݄௜ሻ ൅ ߥ െ ݎ௜, where ݌ 
denotes the price of output ݍ, ݄௜ is the height of building ݅ (in terms of floors), ݎ௜ represents the 
rent for floor space and ߥ is a premium for locating in the tallest building, ߥ ൐ 0 if ݄௜ ൐ max ሺ݄ି௜ሻ, 
and equals zero otherwise, where – ݅ denotes other buildings in the city.5 A tenant’s output is a 
concave function of building height in which the tenant resides, as taller buildings offer more 
opportunities for agglomeration economies. Given a perfect competitive market (so ߨ ൌ 0), the 
bid rent ݎ௜ is equal to ݌ݍሺ݄௜ሻ ൅ ߥ. 
Let’s also assume identical profit-maximising developers that construct office buildings. The 
profit of builder at location ݅ is ߢ௜ ൌ ݎ௜݄௜ െ ܿሺ݄௜ሻ, where ܿሺ·ሻ is an increasing and convex cost 
function.6 The profit-maximising building height for location ݅ then satisfies the following first- 
                                                            
5 Our model slightly deviates from HS. We allow the building production function to be a function of its 
own building height (to allow for increasing returns to scale with respect to building height) and include 
the reputation effect ߥ directly into the rent function. These differences are not essential and do not change 
the main message of the model. 
6 Building height is a better proxy to capture agglomeration economies than building volume for two 
reasons. First, creating low but larger buildings does likely not lead to higher marginal construction costs, 
so conditional on building height, firms can choose building size at no additional costs and hence, there is 
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order condition: ݌݄௜ሺ߲ݍሺ·ሻ ߲݄௜⁄ ሻ ൅ ݌ݍሺ·ሻ ൅ ߥ െ ߲ܿሺ·ሻ ߲݄௜⁄ ൌ 0. Similar to HS we may write the 
payoff of a construction firm with respect to ݄௜ as ߢ௜ሺ݄௜ሻ ൅ ߥ݄௜, where ߢ௜ሺ·ሻ is an increasing and 
concave function. Let ݄௜כ denote the profit-maximising building height in absence of a premium 
for being the tallest (ߥ ൌ 0) and  ݄௜௪ denote the pre-emptive building height. HS prove that if 
builders choose sequentially with builder ݅ choosing first, builder ݅ will choose ݄௜ ൌ ݄ି௜௪ . With 
identical builders ߢ௜ሺ݄ି௜௪ ሻ ൅ ߥ݄ି௜௪ ൌ ߢ௜ሺ݄௜כሻ. In order to win the contest, builder ݅ overbuilds 
relative to the profit maximising building height and the other developers will concede and 
choose ݄ି௜ ൌ ݄ି௜כ . In the current set-up, the prize completely dissipates.7 We emphasise that the 
current model assumes that the prize only applies to the tallest building, while it is plausible that 
the prize applies to more than one building, also because a building may be the tallest building in 
a specific city or neighbourhood. 
Two implications for our empirical work can be derived. First, commercial rents are expected 
to be positively related to building height because of within-building agglomeration economies. 
Second, given a concave function of these agglomeration economies, building height must have a 
concave effect up to a certain height. After that concavity is expected to be weakened due to 
reputation effects. Given a strong reputation effect, the effect of building height may become 
convex for very tall buildings. 
 
B.     A hedonic framework 
The standard procedure to investigate the impact of property and neighbourhood attributes on 
commercial property values is to assume a specific functional form and then regress the price of 
floor space on the variables of interest and a wide range of control variables. Let ݌௜ denote the 
price per square meter of a rental property ݅ and ݄௜ the height of its building. We furthermore 
include control variables ݔ௜, including the log of size of the rental property, and location dummies 
݀௜ to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We start assuming a standard loglinear functional 
form: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
no premium for large buildings. Second, tall, rather than large, buildings imply an extreme density of 
workers (e.g. industrial buildings usually have a large surface area, but do not host many workers). We 
come to this issue in more detail in the sensitivity analysis (section 4C).  
7 HS extend this analysis by considering a simultaneous game with a mixed strategy equilibrium and show 
that this leads to overbuilding for all developers, but the amount of overbuilding decreases when lots are 
more similar and the number of developers rises. 
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                      log ݌௜ ൌ ߙ݄௜ ൅ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ݀௜ᇱߛ ൅ ߦ௜ ,             (1) 
where ߙ, ߚ and ߛ are parameters to be estimated and ߦ௜  denotes the property’s attributes that are 
not observed by the econometrician. We assume that ߦ௜ enters as an additive term. Equation (1) 
may be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) or instrumental variables (IV), when ݄௜ is 
correlated with ߦ௜. 
It is often argued that the nature of the relationship between the price and the attributes is 
complex and highly nonlinear (Ekeland et al., 2004; Bajari and Benkard, 2005, McMillen, 2010). 
So, it is preferred to use a nonparametric model rather than (1). Because the price of the rental 
property is a function of numerous attributes, including many area fixed effects, it would be 
infeasible to estimate a fully nonparametric hedonic price function. We therefore choose a 
partially linear specification in which only  ݄௜ is nonparametrically related to the rental price: 
                                log ݌௜ ൌ Ωሺ݄௜ሻ ൅ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ݀௜ᇱߛ ൅ ߦ௜,             (2) 
where Ωሺ · ሻ is some function of building height. As equation (2) is partially linear, we employ the 
Robinson procedure. First, we regress log ݌௜, ݔ௜ and ݀௜ on ݄௜ nonparametrically. Then, we regress 
the residuals of log ݌௜ on the residuals of ݔ௜ and ݀௜. This leads to √ܰ-consistent estimates for ߚ 
and ߛ. Robinson (1988) showed that the coefficients are estimated at parametric rates of 
convergence, despite the presence of a nonparametric part. The last step is to regress log ݌௫ െ
ݔ௜ᇱߚመ െ ݀௜ᇱߛො nonparametrically on ݄௜.  
We estimate Ωሺ · ሻ by local linear regression techniques.8 Locally weighted regression is the 
most common nonparametric approach to analyse spatial data (McMillen and Redfearn, 2010). 
So, one estimates for each observation a weighted regression based on a kernel. We employ a 
Gaussian kernel where the weight variable is defined as the difference between building height of 
two observations ݅ and ଓ:̃ 
                                               ݇ప̃௜ ൌ ଵఘఙ೓√ଶగ e
ି ଵ ଶ⁄ ሺሺ௛೔ି௛ഢ̃ሻ ఘఙ೓⁄ ሻమ,             (3) 
where ݇ప̃௜ is the kernel weight of ଓ̃ in the local regression of ݅ and ߩ is the bandwidth. A lower 
bandwidth leads to a lower mean-squared error, but to a higher variance of the estimator. A 
                                                            
8 We prefer estimating Ωሺ · ሻ by local methods, opposed to the use of a polynomial approach, cubic 
smoothing splines or Fourier analysis, as the interpretation of the local coefficients is easier and comparable 
to the global coefficient of building height of equation (1) (see McMillen, 2010, for details). Locally 
weighted regression methods also have a lower asymptotic bias than the Nadaraya-Watson estimator and 
a lower asymptotic variance than the Gasser-Müller estimator (Bajari and Kahn, 2005). 
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larger bandwidth may create a larger bias when the underlying function is nonlinear (Fan and 
Gijbels, 1996).9 The estimation procedure is not standard because building height may be 
endogenous. To account for endogeneity, we employ a control function approach (CFA) (see 
Holly and Sargan, 1982; Yatchew, 2003). So, we assume that there are instruments ݖ௜ that are 
uncorrelated with ߦ௜  but correlated with  ݄௜. In the first stage, we regress building height on  ݖ௜, ݔ௜ 
and ݀௜ semiparametrically: 
                         ݄௜ ൌ Φሺݖ௜ሻ ൅ ݔ௜ᇱߜ ൅ ݀௜ᇱߞ ൅ ߟ௜,             (4) 
where Φሺ · ሻ is some function of the instruments and ߜ and ߞ are coefficients to be estimated, 
using the Robinson procedure. We then insert the residuals ߟ௜ as a control function into (2) (see 
Blundel and Powell, 2003).10 
 
III. Regional context, data and instruments 
A.     Regional context 
Our analysis is based on information for three major Dutch cities Amsterdam (the capital), 
Rotterdam (a major port city) and Utrecht, which are respectively the largest, the second and 
fourth largest city in the Netherlands. These three cities combined have 1.7 million inhabitants, 
about 10 percent of the Dutch population, but their combined share in the office market is about 
25 percent (Bak, 2009). All cities are part of the Randstad (see Figure 1). 
Both Amsterdam and Utrecht have protected historic city centres, which puts strong 
restrictions on the construction of new (tall) buildings. The city centre of Rotterdam was 
bombed in World War II leading to a complete redevelopment of this area. Nowadays it is the 
only Dutch city with an American-style central business district with high-rise commercial (and 
residential) buildings. Figures 2-4 illustrate the spatial structure of the selected cities. In 
Rotterdam and Utrecht, building height is generally decreasing in distance to the city centre, 
                                                            
9 Our bandwidth is based on the Silverman’s rule of thumb, which is given by 1.06ߪ೓൫݊ି1 5⁄ ൯, where ݊ is the 
number of observations. Because Silverman’s rule tends to undersmooth the hedonic price function, we 
multiply the bandwidth with two, which is a moderate number. For example, Bishop and Timmins (2008) 
multiply their ‘optimal’ bandwidth with five and interpret that as the best bandwidth. 
10 The control function is estimated using a fifth-order polynomial. The main advantage of using a series 
estimator is that we can employ the semi-parametric estimation procedure of Robinson (1988) to estimate 
log ݌௜ ൌ Ωሺ݄௜ሻ ൅ ݔ௜ ߚ ൅ ݀௜ ߛ ൅ Ξሺߟ௜ሻ ൅ ߦ௜ , where Ξሺ·ሻ demotes the control function. Otherwise, very 
computational intensive procedures such as backfitting have to be employed (Yatchew, 2003). 
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whereas in Amsterdam it is first increasing and then decreasing in distance to the city centre (see 
Figure A1 in Appendix A).11 
 
 FIGURE 1 ― OVERVIEW MAP OF THE RANDSTAD               FIGURE 2 ― MAP OF AMSTERDAM 
 
            FIGURE 3 ― MAP OF ROTTERDAM                FIGURE 4 ― MAP OF UTRECHT 
 
                                                            
11 Amsterdam has a somewhat dispersed urban structure: businesses are concentrated in the city centre, 
but also at the South Axis and in the Bijlmer area. In Rotterdam most businesses are concentrated in the 
city centre, along the axis Weena-Wilhelminapier, although there are secondary subcentres (such as 
Alexander). Utrecht has only one substantial business centre with some high-rise buildings near the 
central railway station. 
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 ‘Skyscrapers’ only recently became a feature of European cities. In the Netherlands, there are 
20 commercial office buildings taller than 100 meter (see Table 1), of which 18 are constructed 
after 1990, so the construction of skyscrapers is booming, as suggested by Helsley and Strange 
(2007). 7 of the 20 tall buildings are located in Rotterdam, 6 in Amsterdam and only one in 
Utrecht. The tallest building in the Netherlands is only recently constructed and is 165 meters 
tall. 
TABLE 1 ― 10 TALLEST OFFICE BUILDINGS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Name Height in m Const. Year Floors City 
1 Maastoren 164.75 2009 44 Rotterdam 
2 Delftse Poort 151.35 1991 41 Rotterdam 
3 Hoftoren 141.86 2003 29 The Hague 
4 Rembrandttoren 135.00 1995 35 Amsterdam 
5 Millenniumtoren 131.00 2000 34 Rotterdam 
6 World Port Center 123.00 2001 32 Rotterdam 
7 Mondriaantoren 123.00 2002 32 Amsterdam 
8 Carlton 120.00 2009 31 Almere 
9 Achmeatoren 115.00 2002 24 Leeuwarden 
10 Erasmus MC 114.27 1969 27 Rotterdam 
 
 
B.     Data 
We make use of three datasets. The first dataset is gathered by Strabo and NVM and consists of 
transactions of commercial office properties, provided by real estate agents between 1990 and 
2010. The property dataset contains information on the transacted rent, rental property 
attributes, such as address, size (gross floor area in square meters), and whether the building is 
newly constructed or renovated.12 The data also provides information on the particular real estate 
agent that is involved in the transaction. The second dataset provides information on the exact 
location, construction year and building height (obtained from the Department of Infrastructure 
and Environment) for all buildings in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht (see Koomen et al., 
                                                            
12 We have also information on sales prices. The main reason that we do not use this information here is the 
limited number of observations (only 436), less than 10 percent of the number of rent transactions. The low 
percentage of owned properties is due to two reasons. First, in the office market it is uncommon that users 
own properties. Second, renting firms are generally more mobile leading to more transactions. We also 
note that office buildings that are rented are more often occupied by many firms compared to buildings 
that are sold. In the rental property market, we may therefore expect that external within-building 
agglomeration effects are more relevant. 
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2008 for more details). The third dataset, the Rijksmonumentenregister (Listed Building Register) 
provides information whether buildings are listed.  
Our analysis is based on 4,792 transactions, about a half for Amsterdam and 25 percent for 
both Rotterdam and Utrecht. 13 In the analysis, we control for a range of locational attributes.14 
First, we add 145 postcode fixed effects, so we have on average 33 observations per postcode.15 
The average distance of a building to all other firms within the same postcode area is only 474 
meters. Besides these fixed effects, we include dummy indicators whether a property is within 
150 meters of a highway, rail line, park or water and within 250 meters of the nearest railway 
station. We also control for the number of listed structures within 150 meters of the rental 
property. Furthermore, we account for the average construction year of nearby buildings, as well 
as nearby building volume (the height of buildings multiplied by their surface area), both 
measured within 250 meters.16 To include the latter is potentially important, as a tall building 
may be a proxy for a dense urban district where agglomeration economies are expected to be 
high. In our analysis we will include dummies for the 10 largest real estate agents to control for 
differences in service levels and specialisation of real estate agents in specific types of offices. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A1 of Appendix A. The yearly rent per square 
meter is on average € 143. The average building height is 29 meters. However, this measure is 
somewhat misleading, as taller buildings also host more rental properties. The building-weighted 
average height of buildings in our sample is indeed lower and equal to 21 meters (where the 
weights are inversely proportional to the number of observations per building). About 40 
percent of rental properties are in buildings lower than 20 meters, but most, 43 percent, are in 
buildings between 20 and 40 meters. About 4 percent of the observations are in buildings taller 
than 80 meters and 1 percent are in buildings taller than 100 meters.  
                                                            
13 We exclude transactions with missing height data,  yearly rents per square meter lower than € 50 or 
higher than € 500 and rental properties that are less than 50 or more than 25,000 square meters. 
14 Eichholtz et al. (2010) argue that there are three approaches to correct for spatial variation in prices. 
First, by including dummies for each submarket. Second, by focusing on a specific city or metropolitan area 
and third, by including locational variables such as distance to railway stations etc. We combine those 
approaches: we focus on three Dutch cities, include location dummies and control for a wide range of 
locational attributes. 
15 Postcode areas are comparable to census tracts in the US. 
16 We do not have information on whether nearby buildings are residential, commercial or mixed. 
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The average floor size of rental properties is 1,130 square meters (about ten times the average 
size of residential properties). The correlation between rental size and building height is 0.11, so 
rather low. So, it is unlikely that especially larger firms (in terms of rental size) occupy tall 
buildings, because these buildings offer space for possible future expansion. The average 
construction year is 1933, so, on average, buildings are quite old in these three cities. This is due 
to many historic buildings in city centres of Amsterdam and Utrecht (but not in Rotterdam). 
However, at the same time, about 43 percent of the rental properties are rather new and in 
buildings that are constructed after 1980.  
 
C.     Instruments 
A positive effect of building height on rents is non-causal when unobserved location and building 
characteristics are correlated with building height. Given that we include area fixed effects, 
unobserved characteristics must be very local and may include trendy restaurants or cafés which 
are popular socialising spots, but also characteristics related to the quality of the building (see 
Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008).17 We therefore need instruments that are correlated with 
building height but uncorrelated with these unobserved factors.  
We start with an analysis using two instruments. The first is a dummy variable indicating 
whether there are pre-war buildings (within 250 meters of the rental property).18 As in other 
European countries, conservation regulations are very tight, especially in historic city centres 
(see Cheshire and Hilber, 2007). When there are pre-war buildings in vicinity, the height of new 
buildings is lower, because new construction is not allowed to damage the pleasing character of 
the neighbourhood (Bertaud and Brueckner, 2005). This holds for the historic city centres of 
Amsterdam and Utrecht, but also for a large number of neighbourhoods in Rotterdam that are 
near the city centre but were not bombed during World War II.19 The instrument’s validity rests 
                                                            
17 For example, we do not control for vacancy rates of office buildings. This may be a problem when 
building height and vacancy rates are highly correlated and the vacancy level affect prices. Our IV approach 
addresses this issue. 
18 We have chosen 1940, as buildings constructed before the war are frequently aesthetically pleasing and 
tend to receive a premium in the residential housing market. 
19 This does not mean that in other neighbourhoods height constraints do not apply. For example, in 
Utrecht developers are not allowed to construct buildings that are taller than twice the height of buildings 
in the neighbourhood (Municipality Utrecht, 2005). In general, however, constraints in new 
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on the assumption that the presence of pre-war buildings is unrelated to current demand for 
location and building endowments (see, similarly, Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Arzaghi and 
Henderson, 2008). We believe this is a plausible assumption, as offices are mainly used by 
business services. The main input of business services is labour and not natural resources or 
capital, so it is likely that endowments that were important at least 50 years ago are totally 
different from the current unobserved endowments.20 This is especially reasonable because we 
condition on building volume in the neighbourhood, the number of listed structures in vicinity, 
the average building construction year in the neighbourhood and because we include area fixed 
effects. 
We also include an instrument indicating the average building height of pre-war buildings in 
vicinity. Conditional on the presence of pre-war buildings, the height of these buildings is 
positively correlated with current height. In a sensitivity analysis, we will use other instruments 
(population density in 1830 and distance to station in 1870), to demonstrate that our results are 
robust to the choice of instruments. 
 
IV. Results 
A.     Main results 
The results for four specifications are presented in Table 2. In Specification (1), we use ordinary 
least squares regression techniques. We observe that building height is positively related to 
commercial office rents, as expected: we find that a 10 meters increase in building height leads to 
a 3 percent increase in rent per square meter.21 In Specification (2), we categorise building height 
into four dummy variables. Now, we find that buildings taller than 100 meters are 40 percent 
more expensive than buildings lower than 20 meters (price per square meter). The building 
height effect is nonlinear, as the effect is about the same for buildings between 40-60 and 60-80 
meters, while it increases afterwards. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
neighbourhoods are less binding and it is possible to obtain permits to construct tall buildings under 
certain circumstances. 
20 For example, in Europe, cars only became a familiar mode of transport after World War II. Pre-war 
locational policies regarding the construction of offices were therefore substantially different from 
contemporary zoning plans, as commuting costs (per unit of time travelled) were much higher. 
21 We investigate whether there is a positive correlation between building height and the area fixed effects, 
as we may expect that buildings are taller on locations that have rents that are higher for unobserved 
reasons. However, it is observed that there is a very weak negative correlation (-0.04).  
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TABLE 2 ― HEDONIC ANALYSIS OF OFFICE RENTS 
(dependent variable: logarithm of rent per square meter) 
 (1) – OLS (2) – OLS (3) – IV (4) – CFA 
Building Height (in 10m) 0.030 (0.002) **    0.042 (0.014) ** 0.048 (0.010) ** 
Building Height 20-40m    0.052 (0.008) **       
Building Height 40-60m    0.111 (0.014) **       
Building Height 60-80m    0.126 (0.016) **       
Building Height 80-100m    0.161 (0.022) **       
Building Height >100m    0.407 (0.031) **       
Floor space (log) -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  
New Building 0.051 (0.010) ** 0.050 (0.010) ** 0.047 (0.011) ** 0.051 (0.011) ** 
Renovated Building 0.021 (0.012)  0.017 (0.012)  0.020 (0.012)  0.019 (0.013)  
Listed Building 0.019 (0.014)  0.017 (0.014)  0.018 (0.014)  0.018 (0.013)  
Construction Year 1951-1960 -0.015 (0.019)  -0.022 (0.019)  -0.013 (0.018)  -0.019 (0.019)  
Construction Year 1961-1970 -0.102 (0.016) ** -0.107 (0.016) ** -0.108 (0.017) ** -0.100 (0.016) ** 
Construction Year 1971-1980 -0.026 (0.013) * -0.033 (0.013) * -0.031 (0.013) * -0.033 (0.014) * 
Construction Year 1981-1990 0.071 (0.012) ** 0.062 (0.012) ** 0.066 (0.013) ** 0.066 (0.012) ** 
Construction Year 1991-2000 0.118 (0.014) ** 0.115 (0.015) ** 0.105 (0.021) ** 0.106 (0.015) ** 
Construction Year 2001-2010 0.048 (0.028)  0.042 (0.029)  0.030 (0.034)  0.058 (0.031)  
Sale and Lease Back -0.015 (0.093)  -0.013 (0.093)  -0.015 (0.090)  -0.019 (0.086)  
Rent All Inclusive 0.070 (0.014) ** 0.070 (0.014) ** 0.069 (0.014) ** 0.061 (0.013) ** 
Turn Key 0.164 (0.023) ** 0.159 (0.024) ** 0.174 (0.026) ** 0.178 (0.025) ** 
Number of Listed Structures <150m 0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000)  
Highway <150m 0.016 (0.013)  0.020 (0.013)  0.008 (0.016)  0.024 (0.012)  
Railway <150m 0.034 (0.011) ** 0.045 (0.011) ** 0.026 (0.014)  0.034 (0.011) ** 
Open Space <150m -0.016 (0.008) * -0.023 (0.008) ** -0.010 (0.010)  -0.018 (0.008) * 
Water <150m 0.006 (0.012)  0.012 (0.012)  -0.002 (0.015)  0.008 (0.011)  
Station <250m 0.008 (0.013)  0.000 (0.013)  -0.011 (0.026)  -0.012 (0.014)  
Building Volume <250m (log) 0.010 (0.010)  0.016 (0.010)  -0.006 (0.022)  -0.006 (0.010)  
Mean Construction Year <250m (4) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Real Estate Agents (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode Fixed Effects (145) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 4,792 4,792 4,792 4,792 
R2 0.702 0.700   
F-test for Weak Instruments   18.032  
Test for Exogeneity (Critical Value)   0.708 (3.841)  
Notes: Instruments in Specifications (3) and (4) are the presence of pre-war buildings and their mean height. The test 
for exogeneity is the robust χ²-score. Robust standard errors are between parentheses. For Specification (4), standard 
errors are bootstrapped (500 replications) and the mean effect of building height is presented. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level 
                      * Significant at the 5 percent level 
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In Specification (3) we use instrumental variables to account for unobserved factors that may 
be correlated with building height. In Appendix A, Table A2, we present the first-stage results. 
The instruments are strong (the F-test is 18) and have the expected effects: the presence of pre-
war buildings in the neighbourhood reduces current building height by about 11 meters (which is 
almost one-third of the mean) and the height of these pre-war buildings has a positive effect on 
building height: a 10 meters increase in the average height of pre-war buildings in the 
neighbourhood leads to an increase in building height of 7 meters. The effect of building height is 
now somewhat larger than for the OLS specification (4.2 rather than 3.0 percent).22  We do not 
find evidence that building height is endogenous. The value of a Hausman exogeneity test is 
0.708, much less than the 5 percent critical value of 3.841. This suggests that unobserved 
locational or building endowments are not, or are at least not strongly, correlated with building 
height.23 
In Specification (4) we employ a control function approach to estimate the nonlinear impact 
of building height (see Section 3A). Table 2 highlights that the average impact is very similar to 
the effect found in Specification (3). Figure 5 presents the marginal willingness to pay for an 
additional 10 meters for Specifications (3) and (4). In Specification (3), we assume that the effect 
is constant. In line with assumptions by HS, Specification (4) indicates that the marginal effect is 
positive and non-monotonic. According to (4), the WTP is slightly diminishing or constant for 
buildings shorter than 25 meters (about 60 percent of the observations) and diminishes for 
buildings up to 90 meters. The latter is in line with the idea that the marginal effect of 
agglomeration economies is positive but diminishing in taller buildings. For buildings taller than 
90 meters, the marginal WTP is increasing. 
                                                            
22 Our finding that the IV effect is somewhat stronger than the OLS effect suggests that firms cluster at 
locations that are unattractive for unobserved reasons (e.g. due to zoning). 
23 Although we have two instruments, one cannot use an overidentification test here, as the mean height of 
pre-war buildings is difficult to interpret if one does not control for the presence of pre-war buildings in 
the neighbourhood. Overidentification tests are more relevant when the instruments are really different 
(Combes et al., 2011). In the next subsection we will show that our results are robust when we choose 
another set of instruments, and we use an overidentification test given this set of instruments. 
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FIGURE 5 ― THE EFFECT OF BUILDING HEIGHT ON COMMERCIAL RENTS 
 
According to HS, the raison d’être of tall buildings are the sum of interactions between 
workers and a reputation effect. Our results support this idea and seem to suggest that within-
building agglomeration economies are important. Given the assumption that the benefits of 
agglomeration diminish with building height, it is striking that for buildings taller than 90 
meters, the WTP for buildings suddenly increases, strongly suggesting that there is a reputation 
effect. As there are only 20 office buildings in the Netherlands that are taller than 100 meters, 
these buildings seem to offer additional amenities to tenants. We indicate the magnitude of the 
reputation effect by the shaded area in Figure 5, given the assumption that (1) the marginal effect 
of agglomeration economies is constant after 80 meters or (2) given that the assumption that the 
effect is diminishing linearly. These two assumptions provide us with a lower and upper bound 
of the reputation effect. Assuming that there is no reputation effect for buildings lower than 90 
meters, we establish that the reputation effect for a building of 100 meters is between 1.5 and 5.8 
percent, while for a building of 130 meters (about 6 times the average height), it is between 17.5 
and 36.2 percent.  
Our empirical results show that nearby building volume does not impact land rents, so the 
presence of between-building agglomeration effects are not confirmed. This finding is even more 
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extreme than the finding that the benefits of more near neighbours decay very rapidly after 250 
meters (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). 
We have to reflect on other reasons that may explain the sudden increase in the WTP for 
building height after 90 meters. For example, one may argue that taller buildings are always of 
higher quality, so that the instruments also capture quality effects. We think this is not a 
problem, because there is sufficient anecdotal evidence that not all tall buildings offer 
exceptional quality.24 It is also important to note that we condition on the construction year and 
dummies indicating whether a building is new or renovated (which should pick up most of the 
effects related to quality) and use instrumental variables that take into account correlation with 
unobserved building endowments. Moreover, the reputation effect seems to be too large to be 
explained by quality differences only. It is also unlikely that the effect of the increased 
willingness to pay is explained by the views that employees like to have.25 When we measure the 
effect of a view, we have a measurement-in-variable error problem, as we do not use (or have) 
information about the height of the floor that a tenant occupies, but only use building height 
(that is on average twice the height of the floor of the tenant, so there is a large measurement 
error). This creates a strong bias towards zero of the view effect (of about 50 percent if height is 
uncorrelated to other regressors). So, it is likely that only a small portion of the effect of building 
height is attributable to better views and certainly does not explain the sudden increase in rents 
after 90 meters.26  
Control variables have in general plausible signs. For example, newly constructed rental 
properties are 5 percent more expensive. When the office is rented all inclusive, the rents are 
about 7 percent higher. Turnkey offices have rents that are 17 percent higher.27 Buildings that are 
constructed more recently are generally more expensive, but this effect is relatively weak (which 
makes sense; one expects a stronger effect of building age on properties’ sales prices, which 
captures future rent revenues, rather than on current rents). Buildings constructed between 1991 
                                                            
24 For example, the building in which the authors work is tall, but of relatively low quality. Another 
example is that speculative developers that aim to construct the tallest building (to capture reputation 
effects) may construct such a building with a tight budget, implying low quality (see Willis, 1995). 
25  Real estate agents indicate that for a building of 10 floors (about 40 meters), the maximum price 
difference between the lowest and highest floor due to better views is only 5 percent. 
26 In subsection 4C we will pay more attention to this issue. 
27 A turnkey office is rented in a ready-to-use condition, including carpets, office furniture, etc. 
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and 2000 are about 12 percent more expensive than those constructed just after the war. 
Buildings constructed between 2001 and 2010 seem, somewhat surprisingly, less expensive than 
buildings that are constructed in previous decade.28 
 
B.     Identification revisited 
A major concern of our identification strategy is that current unobserved characteristics of 
buildings and locations are correlated with the unobserved characteristics of pre-war buildings, 
which invalidates our IV-strategy. We therefore discuss some potential issues with respect to 
the identification strategy and validity of the instruments in more detail. Results are presented in 
Table 3. 
In Specification (5), we estimate the same model, but exclude all locational attributes (such as 
distance to railways, building volume, etc.). When building height is simply a proxy for 
unobserved locational and building quality, or when the instruments are correlated with current 
unobserved factors, the coefficient should drastically change. However, the effect is very similar 
to that in Specification (3). 
TABLE 3 ― HEDONIC ANALYSIS OF RENTS, IDENTIFICATION ISSUES 
(dependent variable: logarithm of rent per square meter) 
 (5) – IV (6) – OLS (7) – IV (8) – IV 
Building Height (in 10m) 0.049 (0.008) ** 0.029 (0.002) ** 0.049 (0.014) ** 0.044 (0.010) ** 
Buildings Before 1940    0.006 (0.019)        
Mean Height Buildings Before 1940    0.003 (0.001) *       
Rental Property Characteristics (23) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighbourhood Characteristics (11) No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode Fixed Effects (145) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 4,792 4,792 4,792 4,792 
R2  0.703   
F-test for Weak Instruments 57.994  46.741 47.206 
Test for Exogeneity (Critical Value) 4.743 (3.840)  2.067 (3.840) 2.185 (3.840) 
Overidentification Test (Critical Value   0.699 (3.840)  
Notes: Instruments in Specifications (5) are Buildings Before 1940 and Mean Height Buildings Before 1940. In 
Specification (7) we include Distance to Station 1870 and Population Density 1830. Specification (8) includes all 
instruments. The overidentification test is the χ²-score. See also Table 2. 
                                                            
28 The reason may be that between 1995 and 2000 there was a substantial shortage in the office market 
(Steinmaier, 2011). A relatively quick response to this shortage may have resulted in the construction of 
low quality office buildings that were completed after 2000. Another reason may be that after 2000 there 
was substantial excess supply of office space, which will have had a dampening effect on office rents, 
especially for newly constructed office buildings that have to attract new renters. 
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For the results presented in Table 2, we use the presence of pre-war buildings and their height 
as instruments for building height. Similar to Au and Henderson (2006) and Arzaghi and 
Henderson (2008), as a second informal test for validity, we include the instruments directly in 
the ordinary least squares regression of rent. When building height is correlated with 
unobserved endowments, the instruments will absorb some of the bias of the current building 
height effect. If the instruments are invalid, the coefficient of building height should decline. In 
Specification (6), however, we find an identical coefficient for building height compared to 
Specification (1), suggesting that our instruments are valid (or that building height is not 
endogenous). It also appears that our instruments have a very small direct impact on the current 
office rents. 
As a third test, we use two alternative instruments (see Table A2). As a first alternative 
instrument we employ municipal population density in 1830 (municipalities at that time were 
much smaller: we have 41 of those municipalities in our three city sample). The instrument’s 
validity rests on the assumption that population density in 1830 is unrelated to current locational 
endowments, but has a causal effect on the current building height (see, similarly, Ciccone and 
Hall, 1996; Combes et al., 2008). Concentrations of people in 1830 imply a current building stock 
that contains more historic structures, leading to lower building heights because of conservation 
policies. However, unobserved endowments of 1830 are likely unrelated to current unobserved 
endowments of office buildings that mainly contain business services. We also include an 
instrument that captures the distance to the nearest station in 1870 (while still controlling for 
the current distance to the nearest station). Railway stations were then an important factor 
enforcing agglomeration of firms and therefore taller buildings (Ciccone and Hall, 1996). 
Specification (7) highlights that the choice of instruments hardly influences our results: the effect 
of a 10 meter increase in building height leads to a slightly higher increase in rents of 4.9 percent. 
So, if anything, our estimates in Table 2 are conservative. The alternative instruments estimates 
also imply that the effect of building height is exogenous (as the value of the exogeneity test 
(2.067) is much less than its critical value). Because the alternative instruments have a very 
different nature, it is informative to apply an overidentification test. This test does not indicate 
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that these alternative instruments are invalid.29 In Specification (8) we include all four 
instruments and find, as expected, that the estimate is in between the estimated effects of 
building height of Specifications (3) and (7). Although the standard error of building height is 
now much smaller, so the power of the exogeneity test is increased, still we do not reject the 
exogeneity assumption. 
 
C.      Other specifications 
In this subsection, we test some other specifications. Results are presented in Table 4. Previous 
studies often use density variables as a proxy for agglomeration economies (see e.g. Ciccone and 
Hall, 1996; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). In Specification (9) we exclude building height from 
the analysis to test whether building volume within a range of 250 meters picks up the positive 
effect of building height. Indeed, in (9) there is a statistically significant and (rather strong) 
positive effect of nearby building volume, whereas in Specifications (1)-(4), we did not find any 
effect of building volume within 250 meters. This suggests that excluding building height 
overestimates the magnitude of between-building agglomeration economies. 
 
TABLE 4 ― REGRESSION RESULTS, COMMERCIAL OFFICE RENTS AND BUILDING HEIGHT 
(dependent variable: logarithm of commercial office rent in Euros per square meter) 
 (9) – OLS (10) – OLS (11) – OLS (12) – OLS 
Building Height (in 10m)    0.037 (0.003) ** 0.031 (0.002) **    
Building Height×Amsterdam (in 10m)          0.038 (0.002) ** 
Building Height×Rotterdam (in 10m)          0.017 (0.003) ** 
Building Height×Utrecht (in 10m)          0.025 (0.004) ** 
Building Volume <250m (log) 0.054 (0.009) ** 0.003 (0.010)  0.013 (0.010)  0.008 (0.010)  
Building Height÷Mean Building Height <250m (log) -0.036 (0.011) **       
Building Surface Area (log)    -0.009 (0.003) **    
Rental Property Characteristics (23) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighbourhood Characteristics (10) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode Areas (145) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 4,792 4,792 4,792 4,792 
R2 0.683 0.700 0.702 0.702 
Notes: See Table 2 
                                                            
29 We also test whether inclusion of the alternative instruments directly in an OLS-specification influences 
the results. Again, the coefficient of building height hardly changes compared to Specification (1) and the 
instruments do not have a statistically significant direct impact on rents. For first-stage results, see Table 
A2, Appendix A. 
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We have excluded area fixed effects to test robustness. It appears that the effect of building 
height is very similar and 3.1 percent. However, the effect of nearby building volume now is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that conditional on building height there are 
agglomeration diseconomies. 
We investigate whether the relative building height (the height relative to mean height of 
buildings in the neighbourhood) has an effect on office rents, in order to attempt to disentangle 
the effect of a view and within-building agglomeration. In Specification (10) we show that the 
relative building height does not alter the overall building height effect and, surprisingly, the 
relative building height effect is negative.30 This suggests that high-rise districts contribute to 
positive reputation effects, whereas having a view is not considered as important. When we 
include the building height relative to the height of the tallest building within 250 meters, the 
effect is negative again, but not statistically significant.31  
We also have re-estimated the model including building’s own surface area (see Specification 
(11)). It is emphasised that the latter is measured with error (as the data on surface area of 
buildings is not always precise). The results are remarkably robust, as the effect of building 
height is now 3.1 percent. Surface area has a slight negative effect. This confirms the assumption 
that in our theoretical setting, building height is a proxy of within-building agglomeration 
economies rather than surface area.32 
Specification (12) investigates whether the preference for building height varies between the 
three cities. Amsterdam has the highest effect, which is not too surprising, as Amsterdam hosts a 
large number of (multinational) firms that have a demand for tall buildings, whereas the number 
of high-rise buildings is limited. Especially for multinational firms, within-building 
                                                            
30 The overall effect of the hedonic price function with respect to building height is then: ߲ log ݌௜ ߲݄௜⁄ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߤ ത݄௜⁄ , where ߤ is coefficient of relative building height and ത݄௜  denotes the average building height within 
250 meters of building ݅. With an average building height of 21 meters, the effect of a 10 meters increase in 
building height is 2 percent for Specifications (10). 
31 Recall that we do not know the floor level. Another way to figure out the impact of a view on rents is 
then to include building fixed effects and examine the effect of address numbers, as higher numbers 
generally indicate a higher floor. So, we construct an index which equals one when the observed rental 
property has the highest address number in a building in our dataset, equals two when the number is the 
second highest, etc. However, we did not find any positive and statistically significant effect of this index. 
Results are available upon request. 
32 We note that the correlation between building volume and height is 0.35. So, taller buildings tend to be 
larger buildings. 
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agglomeration effects as well as reputation-effects are likely to be more important (Smith and 
Coull, 1991; Barr, 2010b). In ‘skyscraper city’ Rotterdam, the effect is about half the effect of 
Amsterdam, which is consistent with the idea that a reputation effect is a relative effect that only 
applies to the tallest buildings, but also may represent the effect of an abundant supply of taller 
buildings. 
 
D.      The regulatory tax and height restrictions 
Until now, we ignored the fact that maximum building height restrictions are the norm in many 
countries, including the Netherlands. In principle, mild restrictions can be justified as HS argue 
that few tall buildings are too high. However, this argument does not apply to lower buildings. 
So, we will focus on the effect of maximum height restrictions that apply to buildings for which 
the reputation effect is small or absent (so below 90 meters). In the literature, it is common to 
interpret the difference between the marginal construction costs of floor space and the marginal 
price of floor space as the regulatory tax. The regulatory tax is an aggregate measure of the gross 
costs of planning constraints, such as height restrictions (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). Previous 
studies that employ this measure are assuming that the marginal price does not depend on 
building height. This may lead to an underestimate of the regulatory tax measure for tall 
buildings, as we have seen that the marginal price is increasing in building height.  
We estimate the regulatory tax, using information from NVM-Strabo on sales transactions 
(instead of rent transactions used in the preceding analysis, which are difficult to compare to 
construction costs). So, we use the average sales price per square meter for office space in 2009 
(436 observations) and then estimate the price increase due to building height using the 
estimates of Specification (4).33 The marginal construction costs (MCC) are obtained from NEN, 
an institute which provides norms for construction costs of buildings (in particular, see NEN 
2631 §3.2).34 De Jong (2007) provides a model to calculate the costs for high-rise buildings in the 
                                                            
33 So, we assume that the effect of building heights on rents also apply to sales prices. Focusing on 
buildings that are lower than 90 meters is useful as we then exclude the reputation effect (which is an 
externality) in the calculation of the regulatory tax. 
34 We verify this cost information using data provided by Bak (2009) and http://www.constructiekosten.nl. One 
may argue that we exclude costs related to parking that may be higher for high-rise buildings. Van 
Ommeren and Wentink (2011) estimate that for offices the average costs for parking are about 8 percent of 
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Netherlands. The increasing costs of elevators, site costs, construction costs, installations and 
foundations are taken into account. We distinguish between a lower and upper bound estimate 
of the MCC. In Figure 7, we present the marginal construction costs and the price up to 90 
meters (by multiplying the building height with the corresponding coefficient, see Figure 5).  
 
 
   (A)              (B) 
FIGURE 7 ― BUILDING HEIGHT: COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
It is striking that the difference between the marginal construction costs and the price is 
about equal for different building heights (see Figure 7A). This suggests that the increase in costs 
of taller buildings is fully offset by higher rents, so the regulatory tax is almost independent of 
height in the range examined (up to 90 meters). Standard welfare economic theory implies that 
in order to maximise profits, building height must be such that the marginal costs of providing 
an additional floor is equal to the marginal willingness to pay (Glaeser et al., 2005; Cheshire and 
Hilber, 2008). As the price is always above the marginal costs until 90 meters (after that, 
reputation effects begin to play a role, which makes it difficult to derive strong conclusions), this 
suggests that not only tall buildings are undersupplied (at least from a developer’s point of view) 
but also that previous estimates of the regulatory tax are underestimates for buildings taller than 
25 meters. In Figure 7B we estimate the regulatory tax for Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the rent, which may be slightly higher for taller buildings. So, this will not change the main results 
presented in this subsection. 
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separately using the estimates of Specification (12). The regulatory tax is then the largest for 
Amsterdam, where sales prices (and rents) are substantially higher. This suggests that the 
optimal building height should be higher in Amsterdam compared to Utrecht and Rotterdam. 
Interestingly, in Rotterdam where building restrictions are less tight (and may be absent in 
certain areas), the regulatory tax is the smallest and becomes even negligible for tall buildings, 
given our ‘high MCC’ assumption. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This is the first paper that attempts to measure the economic benefits of tall buildings, beyond 
the reason provided by standard economic theory that tall buildings arise from economising on 
land rents (Mills, 1967; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002). Helsley and Strange (2008) argue that 
tall buildings facilitate both internal and external returns to scale and induce reputation effects. 
This study demonstrates that there are substantial effects of tall buildings: firms are willing to 
pay about 4 percent for a 10 percent increase in building height. Given the assumption that the 
marginal effect of internal and external returns to scale is non-increasing, we estimate that the 
landmark effect is at least 17.5 percent for a building that is about 6 times the average height. Our 
study also shows that the regulatory tax is independent of height (up to 90 meters), suggesting 
that tall buildings are still undersupplied in the Netherlands. The regulatory tax is especially 
high for Amsterdam, but rather low for Rotterdam. 
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Appendix A. Descriptives and other results 
TABLE A1 ― DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY DATASET 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Rent per m² (in €) 143.320 51.119 50.000 450.000 
Building Height (in m) 28.866 21.371 3.000 150.000 
Building Height <20m 0.395 
   
Building Height 20-40m 0.431 
   
Building Height 40-60m 0.087 
   
Building Height 60-80m 0.046 
   
Building Height 80-100m 0.029 
   
Building Height >100m 0.012 
   
Attributes of the rental property 
    
Size (in m²) 1,131.855 1,791.571 50.000 22,000.000 
New Building 0.074 
   
Renovated Building 0.056 
   
Listed Building 0.095 
   
Construction Year 1932.738 120.896 1200.000 2010.000 
Sale and Lease Back 0.002 
   
Rent All Inclusive 0.025 
   
Turn Key 0.009 
   
Transaction Year 1999.540 5.536 1990.000 2010.000 
Building Surface Area 2,775.554 7,384.551 19.649 66,694.650 
Neighbourhood Attributes 
    
Number of Listed Structures <150m 11.260 30.813 0.000 224.000 
Highway <150m 0.072 
   
Rails <150m 0.161 
   
Open Space <150m 0.435 
   
Water <150m 0.140 
   
Station <250m 0.070 
   
Building Volume <250m (in m³) 558,365.200 354,423.800 99,325.000 1,799,650.000 
Mean Construction Year <250m 1931.123 80.100 1647.444 1999.833 
Instruments 
    
Buildings Before 1940 0.665 
   
Mean Height Buildings Bef. 1940 (in m) 13.502 5.156 1.000 32.000 
Distance to Station 1870 (in km) 2.586 1.633 0.049 11.077 
Population Density 1830 (per km²) 3,416.326 5,023.820 23.102 13,707.420 
NOTE: The number of observations is 4,792. 
 
– 27 – 
 
 
FIGURE A1 ― BUILDING HEIGHT AND DISTANCE TO THE CITY CENTRE 
 
TABLE A2 ― FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS 
(dependent variable: building height in 10 meters) 
 (3) – IV (5) – IV (7) – IV (8) – IV 
Buildings Before 1940 -1.105 (0.206) ** -1.968 (0.189) **    -1.404 (0.203) ** 
Mean Height Bldngs. Bef. 1940 (in m) 0.072 (0.014) ** 0.126 (0.013) **    0.076 (0.013) ** 
Distance to Station 1870 (in km)       -0.728 (0.080) ** -0.786 (0.079) ** 
Population Density 1830÷1000 (per km²)       -0.048 (0.016) ** -0.056 (0.015) ** 
Rental Property Characteristics (23) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighbourhood Characteristics (11) Yes No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies (20) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode Areas (145) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 4,792 4,792 4,792 4,792 
R2 0.545 0.460 0.551 0.559 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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